Shah Shuja’s ‘Hidden History’ and its Implications for the Historiography of Afghanistan by Hanifi, Shah Mahmoud
 South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic
Journal 
Free-Standing Articles | 2012
Shah Shuja’s ‘Hidden History’ and its Implications
for the Historiography of Afghanistan
Shah Mahmoud Hanifi
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/3384
DOI: 10.4000/samaj.3384
ISSN: 1960-6060
Publisher
Association pour la recherche sur l'Asie du Sud (ARAS)
 
Electronic reference
Shah Mahmoud Haniﬁ, « Shah Shuja’s ‘Hidden History’ and its Implications for the Historiography of
Afghanistan », South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal [Online], Free-Standing Articles, Online
since 14 May 2012, connection on 03 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/samaj/3384  ;
DOI : 10.4000/samaj.3384 
This text was automatically generated on 3 May 2019.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International License.
Shah Shuja’s ‘Hidden History’ and
its Implications for the
Historiography of Afghanistan
Shah Mahmoud Hanifi
 
Introduction: Locating Shuja in the first Anglo-Afghan
war and in the context of the Pashtun domination
hypothesis
1 The first  Anglo-Afghan war of  1839-1842 sets  the stage for this  examination of  Shah
Shuja, and the large volume of literature on the war itself requires attention before we
can turn to the Afghan monarch who is most intimately associated with the catastrophic
colonial failure in Pashtun dominated Afghanistan. The first Anglo-Afghan war is well
documented  yet  poorly  understood.  It  is  well  documented  from  the  diplomatic  and
military perspectives, but questions still remain about what is generally viewed as the
most consequential defeat suffered by colonial forces in the history of the British Empire. 
2 Sir  John William Kaye (1854)  produced the first  substantive treatment of  the Afghan
disaster and he located blame with the Governor General Lord Auckland and his circle of
advisors.  Subsequent  authorities  on  the  subject  have  in  various  ways  exonerated
Auckland (Norris 1967) and focused more attention on Alexander Burnes and the Political
Agency System he represents (Yapp 1962, 1963, 1964, 1980: 307-460). Some writers have
drawn attention to the failure of the colonial communication networks in their own right
and in relation to indigenous forms of information circulation (Bayly 1996: 128-140, Iqbal
1975), others point to Anglo-Sikh relations (Hasrat 1959, 1968), while still others have
drawn attention to the failure of supply lines (McMunn 1977: 125). There are multiple
first-hand accounts by British Indian soldiers and administrators that provide extensive
information about the constitution of military units, routing and transportation issues,
and the multiple battles that occurred at various stages of the war (Gould & Chadwick
1880,  Greenwood  1844,  Gupta  1987,  Haughton  1879,  Stocqueler  1983).  Students  also
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benefit from considerable literature on the fateful final march of Army of the Indus from
the Kabul cantonments through its destruction at Jagdalak and final demise at Gandamak
(de Wend 1915, L. Dupree 1976, Macrory 1966). One also finds a good deal of attention to
the Company Surgeon Dr. William Brydon who was the sole survivor of that fateful march
(Trousdale 1983), and the plight of British captives including Lady Sale in Bamiyan (Sale
2002), as well as the siege of Jalalabad and its defense by General Robert Sale (N. Dupree
1975a, 1975b, Trousdale 1983). We have a large volume of writings about the British Army
of Retribution led by Sir George Pollock wherein the contributions of Robert Sale and Sir
William Nott (Kekewich 2011, Nott & Stocqueler 1854) are prominent. There is a postal
history  of  the  war  (Martin  1964)  and  biographies  from  a  number  of  participants,
including the American Quaker Josiah Harlan (Macintyre 2005). 
3 In addition to the multiple general historical analyses (Durand 2000, Forbes 1892: 1-157,
Hay 1911, Morris 1878), the war was reintroduced in the United Kingdom in 1969 through
the historical fiction genre with George Macdonald Fraser’s Flashman novel that became
the first in a popular twelve-volume series (Fraser 2005). Roughly thirty years later in the
United  States  John  Waller’s  (1990)  Beyond  the  Khyber also  garnered  a  good  deal  of
notoriety. The first Anglo-Afghan war received heightened attention after 11 September
2011 with a large number of American and British academics, policy makers, journalists,
amateur historians, and web-based writers and cartographers generating another rich
layer of information about this important conflict (Andovski 2010, Fremont-Barnes 2009,
Johnson 2011, Loyn 2009, O’Ballance 2002: 1-28, Tanner 2002: 136-201, Fibis Wiki website).
4 Looking at these rich and diverse fields of literature on the first Anglo-Afghan war it is
clear the conflict has been revisited by a large number of writers in each country involved
in  subsequent  conflicts.  Each  cycle  of  writings  appears  to  largely  reproduce  and
repackage without substantial alteration a master historical narrative superimposed over
the abysmal loss of the Army of the Indus that jeopardized the fiscal buoyancy of British
East India Company rule in India and triggered events leading to the Great Indian Mutiny
in 1857.2 The master narrative can be outlined as follows. British geo-political concerns
with Russian imperial ambitions led to an ill-advised and poorly executed extension of
British military power in the Hindu Kush in the summer of 1839. 
 
Figure 1: Shah Shuja’s Qandahar Coronation, 18393
British Library Online Collection
5 The poorly conceived occupation met its almost predictable end due to the treachery of
the erstwhile  Afghan ally,  Akbar  Khan,  and the unexpected assassinations  of  its  key
leaders, William Macnaghten and Alexander Burnes, in November of 1841. In January of
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1842  the  occupation  army,  deprived  of  regular  supplies  and  under  the  incompetent
leadership of William Elphinstone, took the disastrous decision to escape Kabul and was
massacred en route to Jalalabad. 
 
Figure 2: General William Elphinstone’s final resting place, Jalalabad, 18784
British Library Online Collection
6 An Army of Retribution was organized later that year. Beyond its own ample resources
the Army of Retribution coordinated the remaining forces under siege in Jalalabad and
Qandahar in order to rescue the British captives in Bamiyan and destroy the spectacular
Mughal covered bazaar in Kabul as a demonstration of reconstituted colonial authority.
 
Figure 3: Jagdalak, 18425, British Library Online Collection
British Library Online Collection
 
Shah Shuja’s ‘Hidden History’ and its Implications for the Historiography of ...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal , Free-Standing Articles
3
Figure 4: Jagdalak, 18796
British Library Online Collection
7 A version of that narrative appears in all English language writings, and among the most
prominent common denominators within the first  Anglo-Afghan war literature is  the
attention  given  to  the  circulating  Durrani  monarchs  Shah  Shuja  (r.  1803-1809  and
1839-1842) and Dost Muhammad (r. 1826-1839 and 1842-1863). 
 
Figure 5: Shah Shuja Durbar, Diwan-e Am, Bala Hissar, Kabul, 18397
British Library Online Collection
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Figure 6: Shah Shuja Durbar, Diwan-e Am, Bala Hissar, Kabul, 18398
British Library Online Collection
 
Figure 7: Diwan-e Am, Bala Hissar, Kabul, 18399
British Library Online Collection
8 Shuja is the Afghan ruler who in 1809 received the first British emissary to the Kabul
Kingdom, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and who thirty years later in 1839 was repatriated by
the Army of the Indus and then met his fate with it. Dost Muhammad is the Afghan ruler
who surrendered to the British at the beginning of the war and returned to power after it
was over.10 
 
Figure 8: Dost Mohammad Surrenduring to Macnaghten, 184011
British Library Online Collection
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Figure 9: Dost Mohammed in Peshawar in British Custody, 184112
British Library Online Collection
9 Just as the master narrative of the first Anglo-Afghan war tends to elide its significant
long-term economic impact on the Afghan economy, the master narrative of modern
Afghanistan as a whole is woven around the theme of Pashtun domination.13 Without the
space here to survey all of the literature on modern Afghanistan, it would be very difficult
to argue the prominent theme of Pashtun domination of Afghanistan does not unify large,
diverse, and growing sets of writings on the country. The most fundamental problem with
the predicate of Pashtun domination of Afghanistan is that it is not explained beyond
reference  to  tribal  genealogies  that,  in  keeping with short  order  thinking about  the
country and its people, are not interrogated as either historical texts or frameworks for
political  action.  In this hasty reasoning manner Shah Shuja is  accepted as a Pashtun
because  he  is  the  grandson of  the  founder  of  the  Afghan state  Ahmad Shah who is
portrayed as a Pashtun, but again conspicuously not demonstrated to be one. 14 Mutatis
mutandis Dost Mohammad becomes merely a ‘rival cousin’ who steps back into a stable
framework of Pashtun domination of the Afghan state after the Shuja’s demise. So the
master narrative of Pashtun domination imposes a view of the multiple reigns of Shah
Shuja and Dost Mohammad and of the first Anglo-Afghan war more generally as simply a
slight  shift  between  from  the  Popalzai  Saddozay  tribal  lineage  to  the  Barakzai
Muhammadzai genealogical branch of Pashtuns who continued to dominate the Afghan
state structure until the Revolution of 1978. Even through the transformative convulsions
of invasions and war characterizing the last thirty plus years, the master narrative still
dictates that Afghanistan be seen as a problem resulting from violent conflict inherent
among Pashtun communities who are by nature hostile to other local tribal and ethnic
groups congenitally predisposed to reject democracy, development and modernity.
10 It is very hard to follow the logic of how Pashtuns, who are allegedly unable to organize
themselves at the state level, can use that very ‘failed state’ in Afghanistan to dominate
anything,  let  alone  other  Pashtuns  who  are  said,  often  in  the  same  breath,  to  be
indomitable. For present purposes, without detailing all of the problematic aspects and
unsustainable tenets of the Pashtun domination thesis,  it  must be emphasized that it
requires its consumers to fundamentally suspend their consideration of the realities of
internal diversity among Pashtun, the many kinds and degrees of exposures Pashtuns
have to non-Pashtuns and the outer non-Pashtun world, as well as the powerful influence
of the Persian language on Pashtuns and in the Afghan state structure.15 The purpose of
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this article is to explore Shah Shuja’s biography with questions about Pashtun domination
and the constitutive and sustained colonial impact on Afghanistan in mind.
 
Elphinstone’s mission and Shuja’s flight from
Peshawar, 1809
11 Mountstuart  Elphinstone is  perhaps best  known for his  administrative service to the
British  East  India  Company  (hereafter  BEIC)  as  Governor  of  the  Bombay  Presidency
(1819-1827) and Resident at Poona (1811-1817). Elphinstone is also very well known for
his ‘Minute on Education’ (1824) and arguably famous for his History of India: The Hindu and
Mohametan Periods (1841)  that  became a  staple  of  Victorian Age reading.  Less  widely
known  aspects  of  Elphinstone’s  life  assume  the  highest  significance  as  foundational
elements  of  Afghanistan  Studies  and  indeed  Afghanistan  itself.  The  referent  here  is
Elphinstone’s inaugural British diplomatic mission (1808-1810) to the reigning King of
Kabul who was then Shah Shuja, and the publication resulting from that delegation titled
An Account of The Kingdom of Caubul (1992).
12 Napoleon’s 1798 invasion of Egypt triggered Lord Minto, the Governor General of the
BEIC, to dispatch diplomatic envoys to the rulers of Persia, Kabul, and the Punjab that
were intended to secure mutual  defense treaties  in the event of  an overland French
invasion of India. These were all very extensive and impressive mobile embassies and
scientific laboratories. John Malcolm led the mission to Persia, Charles Metcalfe was in
charge of the delegation to Maharaja Ranjit Singh in Lahore, and Elphinstone led the
mission to the Kingdom of Kabul.16 Elphinstone’s mission was composed of at least 13
additional British officers, 4000 (combined) infantry and cavalry troops, 600 camels, 13
elephants and in total as a single column stretched nearly two miles.17 Elphinstone and
his large retinue left Delhi in October or November of 1808 and in February 1809 arrived
in Peshawar, a city Shuja considered the winter capital of his Kabul Kingdom. The most
harrowing episode on the nearly four-month and 500-mile long journey was the near
demise of the mission due to lack of water in the Rajasthan desert. Elphinstone achieved
the goal of a BEIC treaty with the ruler of Kabul. He and Shuja signed a treaty the very day
the mission departed from Peshawar, 14 April 1809. The treaty was ratified by Lord Minto
on 14 June.18 
13 Elphinstone’s diplomatic and scientific caravan returned to Delhi in September 1809 and
was disbanded in June 1810, the interim period being dedicated to preparation of the
mission’s final report.19 Portions of the report were published in 1815 in a book form as
An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul that was twice reprinted in 1839 and 1842 for military
and public reference in the context of the first Anglo-Afghan war. Elphinstone and his
delegation were charged with producing an original and encyclopaedic reference work
about the Kingdom of Kabul and its dependencies through their own scientific research.
In large measure the scientific investigations performed by the British officers including
Elphinstone were predicated on harvesting information from local informants, some of
whom such  as  a nephew of  Sayyid  Muhin  Shah  were  paid a  ‘handful  of  money  for
answering a few questions’ while others were commissioned to undertake more elaborate
ethnographic inquiries, for example Rs. 50 per month to one Mulla Najib contracted to
gather  linguistic  and  other  data  about  the  Siah  Posh  communities  in  Kafiristan.20
Although it  is  unclear  precisely  who and to  what  extent  others  beyond Elphinstone
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contributed to An Account that bears his name, the book is the first substantive British
Indian publication dedicated to Afghanistan and it remains arguably the most important
English language text about the country.21 
14 Archival  records  reveal  that  while  in  Peshawar  meeting  with  the  Kabul  King  and
gathering materials for his report, Elphinstone and other members of his delegation were
receiving both local first-hand information about the rapid demise of his host’s position
as Shah and communications from Shuja’s usurper and half-brother Mahmoud.22 While in
Peshawar Elphinstone singularly received multiple letters from his superiors conveying
intelligence about Shuja’s precarious position proffered by advocates of Mahmoud (a half-
brother of Shuja who like Shuja and Dost Muhammad had to reign) now lobbying the
British in Delhi. These mailings concerned protocol details about how various levels of
the BEIC hierarchy and their clients/dependents in the Mughal court planned to formally
receive and treat these Afghans who were opposed to Shuja, and what actually occurred
during those communications and interactions. The decision whether or not to inform
Shuja about the activities of opposition parties to his rule in Delhi with British officials
and Mughal intercessors was left to Elphinstone.
15 Shuja was in fact displaced as the ruler of Kabul by Mahmoud while Elphinstone was still
in Peshawar.  Elphinstone and his  superiors  were fully  aware of  Shuja’s  rapid loss  of
political buoyancy and knew they were signing a treaty with a defunct regime. As noted
above, immediately after securing Shuja’s signature on the treaty Elphinstone and his
delegation began their return to Delhi. Roughly 80 miles from Peshawar at Hassan Abdal,
shortly after crossing the Indus, Elphinstone was overtaken by Shuja’s zenana or harem of
at least seven known wives and an unknown number of concubines and dependents who
were  desperately  fleeing  Peshawar  for  Delhi  while  Shuja  himself  tried  to  elude  his
usurpers and escape Peshawar.23
16 As a known fugitive or refugee with British contacts Shuja still represented an important
variable in local and regional political dynamics and as such he became a useful pawn
after his displacement from Peshawar and the Kabul throne. For approximately five years
after he and Elphinstone signed the treaty and parted company Shuja was on the run.
During this time he appears to have been trying to make his way to British India to join
his wives but such a reunion would not be immediate. Instead Shuja was symbolically
hosted but practically imprisoned by rivals who might later become allies, and visa versa,
at  least  three  times  including  confinements  in  Attock  (c. 1811-1812),  Kashmir
(c. 1812-1813) and most significantly for us in Lahore by Maharaja Ranjit Singh between
roughly 1813 and 1815.24 
 
Activities of Shuja’s wife Wafa Begum culminating in
the permanent pension for Shuja and his household,
1809-1816
17 It is unclear precisely what happened to Shuja’s zenana after passing Elphinstone on the
road from Peshawar in the spring of 1809, but the harem caravan was destined for British
India.  By late summer or early fall  British officials were discussing which account to
charge when presenting Wafa Begum with a gift of Rs. 1,000 and how much it would cost
for  Shuja’s  favored wife  and her  followers  to  live  ‘comfortably  and decently.’25 Wafa
Begum did not immediately settle in any single location in British India,  instead she
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appears to be trying to reconnect with Shuja who as indicated was detained in various
locations between his former dominions and British India after exiting Peshawar.
18 By late 1812 Wafa Begum was in touch with British officials to solicit their assistance in
securing the release of some of her relatives, but apparently not Shuja, from the custody
of  Maharaja  Ranjit  Singh.26 This  prompted  a  flurry  of  colonial  communications  in
anticipation  of  her  arrival  in  British  India.  The  BEIC  concluded  that  despite  the
‘inconvenience,  embarrassment,  distaste,  disutility,  expense  and  regret’  of  an
‘unavoidable scenario’ her ‘rank and calamities’ would ultimately dictate ‘granting her
asylum, dignity and respect.’27 At this time the British were not considering a permanent
pension or provisions for Wafa Begum and wanted it made crystal clear to ‘her and any
other females’ that while in British India they can give absolutely no ‘aid or protection to
any male branches of the family or any of the numerous dependents and followers.’28 It is
noteworthy that to convey their intended messages the British used direct written and
oral communications with Wafa Begum as well as local newspapers in Lahore (at least) to
publicly broadcast their position regarding displaced Kabul royalty.29
19 By the  summer of  1813 Ranjit  Singh had taken possession of  Shuja  the  person and,
apparently  of  more  importance  to  the  Maharaja,  the  famous  Koh-i  Nur diamond
Elpinstone saw adorning the former Kabul ruler’s elbow bracelet.30 The BEIC believed
Shuja would soon be released and that both he and ‘his queen’ would make their way to
British  India.  The  British  had  been  expecting  to  receive  Wafa  Begum for  years  and
colonial authorities were prepared to tolerate her presence in their territory, but they
were  increasingly  adamant  that  all  possible  steps  be  taken  directly  and  through
intermediaries  to  ‘dissuade,  discourage  and  resist’  Shuja’s  presence  that  would  be
‘infinitely more troubling’ than his wife’s.31 The inevitable negotiations with both Shuja
and Wafa Begum required ‘all the talents and reserves’ of the BEIC Resident in Delhi, who
was then the aforementioned Charles Metcalfe, with David Ochterlony assuming the post
subsequently.
20 Ochterlony was positioned in and around Ludhiana and Karnaul that were two likely
destinations of asylum-seeking Afghan elites given the precedents of the Afghan monarch
Shah Zaman (1770-1844). Zaman reigned in Kabul between 1793 and 1800 when he was
deposed and blinded by Mahmoud.  Zaman appears to be the first  Afghan elite to be
granted a British pension in Ludhiana in 1801.32 Elphinstone met him when returning
from Peshawar and encountering Shuja’s speeding harem at Hassan Abdal in 1809 (see
above). Zaman, Mahmoud and Shuja were all half-brothers sharing as their father Timur
Shah (r.  1773-1793) who was the son and successor  of  the Afghan empire’s  founder,
namely, Ahmad Shah (r. 1747-1773).
21 Ahmad Shah was born in Multan in 1722 and in the spring of 1815 Wafa Begum was
petitioning the British to leverage Ranjit for the release of Shuja so that they two could be
reunited there in what might have been viewed as an ancestral homeland among many
homelands.33 Records indicate the primary British concern was how various potentialities
of receiving Shuja and his household at any location or communicating with him in any
formal capacity would impact the BEIC relationship with the emerging Sikh empire of
Ranjit Singh. The mutual defense treaty Charles Metcalfe failed to secure was likely a
primary source of this institutional preoccupation. That conjecture notwithstanding, in
August 1815 the BEIC rendered it prudent to grant Wafa Begum a pension of Rs. 1,500 per
month.34
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22 What exactly transpired over the next year is unclear, but in September 1816 the British
decided to grant Shuja an annual pension of Rs. 50,000.35 This figure was inclusive of all
previous arrangements with his dependents including Wafa Begum and remained valid
while he and his household remained under British jurisdiction. When Lieutenant Murray
was sent to convey the terms of this pension to Shuja in October he reported that the ex-
King of Kabul ‘who spoke good but soft and low Persian…considered himself at home’
with those arrangements.36 Murray provided details about the precise statements, spatial
movements,  physical  gestures,  and material  exchanges comprising this  encounter.  In
Murray’s descriptions the heavily influential role of Shuja’s Persian-speaking ‘confidante
and preceptor’ Mullah Shakur Ishakzai is most noticeable. As the wazir-e azam or chief
minister and the usual go-between for Shuja in written and oral communications with his
British patrons, his wife Wafa Begum, his onetime captor and would-be ally Ranjit Singh,
Hindu bankers from Shikarpur, and the Sind Amirs, Mullah Shakur was clearly the most
influential member of Shuja’s small inner circle of confidantes.
23 Between November 1816 and July 1817 Murray and Mullah Shakur communicated and
interacted  extensively.37 Murray  was  stationed in  Ludhiana  and his  duties  appear  to
revolve exclusively around the pensioned ex-king. The day after his first introduction
Murray  received  written  requests  from  Mullah  Shakur  regarding  Shuja’s  desired
appropriation  of  one  of  three  residences  already  occupied  by  British  officers  in  the
vicinity of Wafa Begum’s recently acquired domicile. Communication ensued about those
three and additional possible residences for Shuja alone, alternative homes for both Shuja
and Wafa Begum, and about the technical prospects and estimated costs of potentially
closing public roads to make private passages between separate residences. From records
examined in Lahore it is unclear precisely where Shuja and Wafa were finally situated, or
if one or both of them ever changed or shared residences while in Ludhiana. What is clear
is  that  privacy  was  a  primary  concern  of  Shuja’s,  and  Mullah  Shakur  repeatedly
complained to Murray about that value being compromised by passersby mounted on
elephants.38 
24 The concentration of records for the approximate eight-month period after Shuja was
granted  his  pension  reveal  features  of  communicative  practice  on  each  side  of  this
asymmetrical  relationship.  From the  British  Indian vantage  point  it  was  essential  to
disassociate themselves from their client’s expressed aspirations to recover the Kabul
throne.39 But of course this particular position with reference to Shuja was destabilized by
the British pension that entailed a number of widely publicly known components of their
material  support  beyond  the  mere  physical  location  of  complimentary  and
complementary residences. To help sooth the tension between the theory and practice of
their policy toward Shuja, Murray was instructed to disseminate official positions and
refutations  of  ‘bazaar  rumor’  via  local  news  writers,  their  publications  and  the
conversations those texts produced. 
25 Some of the challenges the British had with reference to Shuja came from the ousted
dynast’s  own  camp  which  tried  to  generate  a  robust  public  rendition  of  colonial
patronage via its own networks of local communication that were never fully captured by
British. In this information battle Mullah Shakur was repeatedly chastised by Murray for
a number of communicative missteps and oversteps. One of the issues of contention was
the circulation of alleged forgeries of correspondence between Shuja’s zenana and the
British that jeopardized the pension itself.40 This episode reveals targeted messaging and
disinformation  campaigns  waged  between  Shuja  and  the  British  were  triangulated
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through the relatively independent agencies of Wafa Begum personally and the zenana
generally. 
26 Armed horsemen comprise the final  principal  subject area addressed in the cache of
archival documents generated in the months following the implementation of Shuja’s
pension. The British characterized the approximate 4,000 horsemen in Shuja’s entourage
as  ‘unfortunate,  presumptuous,  and rapacious’  and note  it  was  legal  for  them to  be
carrying away Shuja’s property in lieu of pay while migrating to an alternative center of
Afghan political gravity in Karnaul.41 To replace this growing deficit among his retainer
corps Shuja tried with little success to hire the ‘Hindustani’ horsemen he was fond of
hunting with in daylight hours for night-time watch duty.42 The hiring of non-Afghan
Hindustani  military  labor  was  contentious  because  of  Shuja’s  declared  intention  to
recapture what he termed wilayat with the support of the wilayatis who still remained
loyal to him.43 The point of friction was that Shuja had only the pension as income and
the pension itself could not be used for purposes at odds with official British policy that
in this case was not to support his desire to recapture Kabul. The issues relating to Shuja’s
armed retainers were amplified by discrepancies in the amounts and modes of payment
of  the pension.  These quandaries  were particularly  acute during the early  transition
months after Shuja was deemed to receive Rs. 50,000 annually which as noted subsumed
Wafa Begum’s previously granted Rs. 1,500 monthly pension.44
27 The  cumulative  impact  these  issues  entailed  for  his  emerging  relationship  with  the
British apparently depressed Shuja to the extent that he expressed a desire to visit the
ziarat or shrine of his spiritual ancestor, the Naqshbandi Sufi Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi
(c. 1564-1624),  known  as  the  mujaddid-i  alf-i  thani or  the  Renewer  of  the  Second
Millennium.45 Murray discouraged this request for spiritual relief that in symbolic terms
at least would have made the pension appear more like a prison to Shuja.
 
Shuja’s failed attempt to recapture Kabul, household
defections and education, 1832-1836
28 The second bundle of archival material for Shuja is from the 1830s and contextualized by
the  BEIC  desire  to  ‘open  up  the  Indus  River  for  commercial  navigation  […]  just  as
Alexander had planned two millennia ago.’46 The colonial plan for the Indus culminated in
the Army of the Indus that ultimately evaporated on retreat from Kabul in January 1842.
The Indus Navigation Project represented and underwrote the Army of the Indus.47 The
Indus Navigation Project  was informed by a scientific  understanding of  dyadic fiscal,
physical and temporal relations between the markets of Kabul in the Hindu Kush and the
hypothesized but never realized port market of Mithenkote that was to be situated near
the conflux of the five rivers of the Punjab. The Indus Navigation Project was predicated
on an over-confidence in the prospects of modern technology to surmount nature by
dredging the Indus and eliminating its floods, thus allowing for the construction of an
inland port at Mithenkote that could be serviced by specially configured flat-bottomed
steamships from Europe on the one hand and Afghan nomadic traders and their camels
routed from Kabul on the other.48 To be realized the Indus Navigation Project required
the  cooperation  of  Ranjit  Singh  and  a  compliant  ruler  in  Kabul,  thus  the  collusion
between Ranjit, Shuja and the British in the Tripartite Treaty of 1839 sanctioning the
formation and actions of the ill-fated Indus Army that is the normative historiographic
focus of the first Anglo-Afghan war.49 What is of interest here is Shuja’s earlier similarly
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unsuccessful attempt to re-capture Kabul made between 1832-34 without overt public
political endorsement or military support from the BEIC.50 
29 Even before his British pension began in 1816 Shuja wrote multiple letters to Elphinstone
to  seek  assistance  in  reclaiming  Kabul.51 Toward  that  end  during  the 1820s  Shuja
continued  writing  to  lobby  his  cause  with  Elphinstone  and  increasingly  influential
colonial officials, ever more residual Mughal elites, and his former captor Ranjit Singh. By
the early 1830s the BEIC had begun to survey the Indus and to calibrate the colonial
commercial  and  political  agenda  around  Kabul  in  opposition  to  Russian  imperial
expansion in Central Asia. It is important to note the chronological overlap between the
Indus Navigation Project and colonial fantasizing about Mithkenkote on the one hand and
Shuja’s first failed attempt to re-conquer Kabul on the other. After considerable effort
Shuja was able to gain a four-month advance on his monthly pension from the BEIC and
in early 1832 he set out from Ludhiana for Kabul via the southern Shikarpur-Qandahar
route.52 Most  of  the northerly trajectory from Ludhiana to Kabul  via the Punjab and
Peshawar was under the control of Ranjit Singh. Shuja and Ranjit had reached a ‘pincer
movement’ agreement against the reigning Amir of Kabul, Dost Mohammad, with Shuja
to reclaim his old throne in Kabul and Ranjit to take Peshawar. The BEIC sanctioned this
plan, however informally or surreptitiously, through at least the lack of opposition to it.53
30 Shuja’s expedition expected but ultimately failed to generate momentum in fiscal and
physical terms as it moved from Ludhiana toward Kabul.54 The keys to being able to pay
for the mobile and growing army necessary to capture Kabul were to secure the financial
hub of Shikarpur and the support of Shikarpuri financiers, in either chronological order.
Shuja encountered financial difficulties soon after leaving Ludhiana. To pay for his troops
and their various support personnel including craftsmen and merchants before reaching
Shikarpur Shuja had to mortgage some of his property and borrow against his British
pension  from  Indian  bankers  that  accompanied  his  army.55 Despite  these  financial
challenges Shuja managed to retain his European advisors and at this still formative stage
in  early  1833  his  army  and  intentions  were  consequential  enough  to  generate
correspondence with Dost Mohammad and his brothers who served as vice regents in
Peshawar and Qandahar.56 Shikarpur had been vacated and his troops occupied a financial
center emptied of treasure, but by seizing the city Shuja appears to have increased his
threat  level  in the eyes  of  Dost  Mohammad who wrote to him in May in somewhat
conciliatory terms offering a son as a hostage and a reinstatement of some of Shuja’s
former titles and privileges if the expedition were terminated.57 
31 This letter had no effect on his plans and Shuja’s army left Shikarpur for Qandahar via
Sind in early 1834. During this movement Shuja resolved tension with the Sind Amirs
resulting  from  his  extortion  of  an  untold  amount  of  rupees  from  the  financiers  of
Shikarpur who eventually repopulated the city. Shuja captured Qandahar in March 1834.58
The occupation of Qandahar was quite brief, despite a large body of Dost Mohammad’s
forces dispatched to relieve Shuja’s siege of the Qandahar citadel having been redirected
toward Peshawar after that city was taken by the forces of Ranjit Singh. The increasing
number of defections among Shuja’s forces during the siege of the citadel led to the
disbandment  of  his  consistently  fiscally  tenuous  expedition.  With  his  plans  rapidly
unraveling Shuja feigned an escape to Herat only to make a return to his safe haven in
Ludhiana through the still relatively friendly terrain controlled by the Amirs of Sind.
32 During this return flight to British India Shuja communicated with the Sind Amirs about
monetary losses he suffered from the approximately 500 Sindi horsemen who offered
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their services to him but were rejected and then absconded leaving a Rs. 500 debt to the
bankers in his camp.59 The still ex-King of Kabul appears to have ended his reconquest
expedition in the summer of 1834 with the mortgaging of personal property that mirrors
how the unsuccessful foray began nearly two and a half years earlier. The mortgaging
incident that occurred on return to Ludhiana involved the disappearance of the finance
minister Shuja employed on this expedition, the Shikarpuri Hindu Lala Jeth Mal, who was
said to be in unwarranted possession of property valued at Rs. 50,000 being held as loan
collateral.60 Correspondence with the Sind Amirs and BEIC officials including Elphinstone
directly, indirectly through Mulla Shakur, and via letters delivered by runners led to the
return of the goods in question that included an illuminated Quran, a jeweled battle axe
and a telescope. In these communications that lasted until at least the summer of 1835
Shuja  and  Mulla  Shakur  tried  to  emphasize  the  expedition  was  not  defeated  by  its
opposition, but rather failed merely for want of money.61 In terms of cost it was noted
that sieges such as that in Qandahar are particularly expensive and that Shuja’s army
required one lakh or Rs. 1,00,000 per month to be properly maintained. 
33 Shuja’s defeat had a number of important and arguably predictable ramifications on his
household affairs in Ludhiana. These include apparent defections of important members
of his family, most notably his eldest son Timur on more than one occasion. In December
1835 Timur entered British records for being abandoned by his servants on one of his
escapes, and then managing to borrow money that he could not repay against his father’s
pension.62
34 Archival reference to schools and education during the 1830s are most consequential for
us because they speak to planning for a prolonged stay of Afghan elite pensioners and
their  dependents in Ludhiana and elsewhere in British India.  Both pensioned former
Shah’s  of  Kabul,  namely  Zaman and Shuja,  established schools  for  their  dependents.
Zaman established a school with a combined Arabic and Persian curriculum and Shuja a
school  that  operated  only  on  the  Persian  model.  In  approximately  July  1836  the
pensioners began to petition the British for more funds to purchase books or for gratis
texts for these schools. It is unclear from the materials consulted precisely when schools
sprung up within the Afghan community in Ludhiana, but by the summer of 1836 there
were approximately 3000 school age males enrolled in Zaman’s and Shuja’s schools.63
35 Schools run by Afghans in Ludhiana must be seen in relation to the schools run by the
British  in  that  city  and  elsewhere.  The  school  organized  under  the  direction  of  the
influential political agent in Ludhiana, Claude Wade, had in 1834 attracted the attention
of a key local intelligence provider and logistical ally in Kabul for the British, Nawab Jabar
Khan who was  an  elder  half-brother  of  Dost  Mohammad.  Nawab Jabar  Khan had to
arrange for the secret escape of his son Abd al-Ghias Khan out of Kabul to attend Wade’s
school in Ludhiana. Once there, Abd al-Ghias received a monthly British scholarship/
pension of Rs. 100 per month. This was apparently insufficient and just like Shuja’s son
Timur so too did Abd al-Ghias run away and accrue large debts on the open market.64 For
colonial officials these actions only served to complicate the presence of their Afghan
clients in British India.
36 Full attention to competing schools and the politics of education more broadly among
Afghan refugees, exiles and pensioners in British India is beyond the scope this paper.
The subject of education nevertheless is a reminder that we are discussing a community
of Afghans composed primarily of exiled and pensioned former elites that numbered in
the multiple thousands in Ludhiana in the 1830s. The historical trend for Afghans to seek
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education in India continued, and today Afghans are the largest population of foreign
students in India, with Hamid Karzai’s Master’s Degree from Simla University in 1983
being a notable example of that long-standing pattern of Afghan intellectual migration to
the subcontinent.  Beyond intellectual  migration,  Shah Shuja’s  inter-regnal  years  as  a
pensioner  in  Ludhiana  draw  attention  to  other  forms  of  movement  and  circulation
between Afghanistan and India including military and commercial migrations, as well as
spiritual pilgrimages. 
 
Conclusion: unlearning and relearning Afghanistan
through Shah Shuja 
37 The variety and constancy of migrations between Afghanistan and India is an important
historical theme evinced by Shah Shuja’s biography. The patterns of migration between
Afghanistan  and  India  vary  by  theme  (e.g.,  secular  or  religious  learning,  commerce,
politics),  through  multiple  historical  areas  (e.g.,  pre-Islamic,  early  Islamic,  Mughal,
colonial)  and  across  different  cultural  and  spatial  geographies  and  circuitries  (e.g.,
Bamian-Gandhara,  Ghazni-Lahore,  Kabul-Delhi,  Qandahar-Karachi).  During  Shuja’s
lifespan the lucrative provinces of Sind, the Punjab and Kashmir fell away from Kabul’s
sway and rival centers of political gravity such as Herat, Peshawar and Qandahar exerted
independence  from  the  emerging  tenuously  singular  state  capital  of  Kabul.  Shuja’s
biography represents the last gasp of mobile kingship and thus the end of the Afghan
empire and, simultaneously, the determining influence of colonialism on the historical
profile of the increasingly Kabul-centered Afghan state. While Shuja therefore helps us
see that colonialism transformed patterns of migration between Afghanistan and India in
general  terms,  his  case  highlight  a  conspicuous  larger  pattern  of  circular  migration
among political elites that will be considered below. First, however, we need to consider
how the master narratives of the first Anglo-Afghan war and Afghanistan more generally
fail to help us understand Shah Shuja’s biography.
38 As indicated in the introduction to this essay, the master narrative of the first Anglo-
Afghan war follows a military timeline that de-emphasizes the less dramatic economic,
intellectual and cultural exchanges that occur beneath and around the chronologies of
coercion that are supplied in overabundance to new generations of would-be-conquerors
of Afghanistan and students of failed colonial conquests. The master historical narrative
of Afghanistan that took shape during the colonial era has been transferred into Afghan
nationalist historiography. From the perspective of stakeholders in that totalizing vision
of Afghanistan, this distillation of archival records about Shuja’s pension in Ludhiana
might be seen as ‘airing dirty laundry’ about the exceptional experiences of a unique
ruler whose aberrant over-dependency on the British ultimately cost him his life. After
all, those addicted and confined to the master narrative would say, the bloody end of
Shuja’s second tenure represents the ‘real history’ of eternally xenophobic Pashtun tribal
resistance to imperial  aggression of  one sort  or another that  has been occurring for
millennia.
39 What is  strikingly ironic about the rich colonial  archival  database on Shuja that one
would expect to support the master narrative of Pashtun dominance of Afghanistan is
that it does the opposite. There are a number of criteria available for evaluating Pashtun
identity, speaking Pashto (Pashto wayal) and the behavioral exhibition of core values (
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Pashtunwali) in ‘doing Pashto’ (Pashto kawal) being at once ordinary and primary features
of Pashtun identity. Nowhere in the hundreds of files on Shuja, scores of which are cited
here,  is  there  any  reference  to  the  peripatetic  king  speaking  Pashto  or  practicing
Pashtunwali. A researcher can look in vain for evidence of Pashtun identity or Pashtun
tribal connections in the thousands of pages providing extremely minute detail on, for
example, patterns of speech and domestic arrangements. In terms of verbal conduct, it is
clear that Shuja was a monoglot Persian speaker and did not know Pashto or display any
need or desire to engage the Pashto language, or any other language for that matter. In
terms of the exhibition of the core values of Pashtunwali,  far from practicing badal or
anything resembling blood revenge,  for example against  his  captor Ranjit  Singh who
carted him around in a cage and dispossessed him of the famous Koh-e Nur diamond,
Shuja appears interested in forgetting the past, and making an alliance with Ranjit Singh
to continue with that example of  a lack of  vengeance for being publicly dishonored.
Instead  of  practicing  purdah or  female  seclusion,  Shuja  put  his  wife  Wafa  Begum
metaphorically and literally ahead of himself in relation to the wider public that was not
limited  to  just  British  colonial  officials.  Another  primary  contradiction  between  the
master narrative of Pashtun domination and Shuja’s lived experience was that he was
unable to offer melmastia or hospitality of his own, and instead had to accept nanawati or
asylum from the British! Perhaps the most basic problem is that Pashto and Pashtuns are
grounded in rural zone, while Shuja’s predilection was for the urban life.
40 The imposition of what Edward Said (1994) helps us identify as a highly Orientalized pre-
packaged master narrative about Pashtun identity and Pashtun domination do not help
us understand Shah Shuja and his place in Afghan history, rather, those faulty templates
distort the historical realities of his cultural profile and the cultural complexity of the
country-at-large.  Following  Said’s  general  cultural  critique  while  offering  a  specific
conceptual  remedy  to  the  prevailing  Orientalist  mystification  of  Pashtuns  and
Afghanistan, I suggest an inversion of the ordinary analytics that impose a Pashtunization
agenda on Shuja and the Afghan state elites he represents. As an alternative to existing
models  of  tribalism,  ethnicity  and/or  nationalism  among  Pashtuns,  the  concept  of
migration provides a much more appropriate mechanism for drawing larger meanings
from the ample concrete data we have about Shuja’s  biography.  The argument for a
revisionist approach to Shah Shuja specifically and Afghan historiography more generally
is essentially advocating a data-first methodological approach to the subject matter. Once
intellectually liberated from the politically addictive qualities of a hyper-ethnicized and
militarized master narrative,  Shuja does not appear as the exceptional  dynast  whose
dependencies were clearly out of line with the normative but awkward understanding of
perpetual Pashtun rule in Kabul. Instead, Shuja’s external dependency becomes the most
characteristic feature of the Afghan political  system. Shuja’s and other Afghan elites’
resource  dependency  sustained  a  pattern  of  circular  migration  that  requires  brief
attention.
41 A  cursory  review  of  Afghanistan’s  history  beginning  with  its  founder  Ahmad  Shah
through to the present Hamid Karzai will indicate that a high level of dependency on
external resources is a primary characteristic of Afghan political elites and the regimes
they form. The basic pattern is as follows: rulers take local power in relation to external
resources; this prompts the voluntary or forced migration of local political opponents;
many of those opponents receive refuge and asylum from the (same) external powers that
routinely provide resources to exiles and refugees;  the collusion of interests between
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powerful ‘host’  external actors wanting to advance their peripheral interests and the
deracinated dependent ex-elite ‘guests’ hopeful of regaining their former status in Kabul
with external support is realized; the cyclical pattern is repeated.
42 This  migration-based  model  of  Afghan  history  is  predicated  on  circulation and  the
continual  relationship between internal  and external  processes that form the Afghan
political system. The circular migration model does not fit every Afghan ruler and each
historical  era  perfectly,  but  it  carries  the  weight  of  much  evidence.  The  model  is
particularly  useful  for  helping  to  explain  how  Afghan  elites  such  as  Shuja  and  his
household  were  exposed  to  colonial  frameworks  of  understanding  and  acting  on
Afghanistan while in ‘diaspora,’ during which time they received education, training and
incentives to transfer colonial practices and frames of reference ‘back’ to Afghanistan
when ‘repatriated.’ The Afghan national reproduction of colonial ideologies through the
conduit  of  circulating  political  elites  requires  separate  treatment,  here  Shuja  only
illuminates the historical pattern to be explored elsewhere.
43 Far  from understanding  Afghanistan,  particularly  the  origin  and organization of  the
Afghan state, through atavistic Pashtunness that cannot be extinguished, the history of
Shuja’s  near  quarter  century  in  Ludhiana  force  us  to  reckon  with  the  non-Pashtun,
particularly the Persianate features of the Afghan polity, and the wide range of external
influences including especially colonialism’s economic effect on Afghan society and its
intellectual and ideological impact on Afghan elites. What I have called Shuja’s ‘hidden
history’  highlights how much there is yet to learn, and what must be unlearned and
relearned  about  Afghanistan.  It  is  time  to  unlearn  historically  static  Pashtun  ethnic
domination as  the key to understanding Afghanistan. It  is  time to think much more
seriously about a number of other issues, including the multiple historically conditioned
migration patterns and the permeability of Afghan cultural identities generated by those
movements and interactions. So, then, despite his lack of Pashtun credentials and his
intimate colonial connections, Shah Shuja can be embraced for at least helping us toward
new and improved  ways  of  knowing  Afghanistan  based  upon historical  and  cultural
realities,  no matter how uncomfortable these facts are to reckon with for those who
remain invested in a crumbling master narrative.
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NOTES
2. See Bilgrami 1972: 109-10 for the war resulting in Indian bankruptcy as well as fueling the
Great Mutiny, and Engels for more on the war’s ruinous effect on British Indian finances.
3. Figure 1:  The city of Kandahar. This is plate 14 from ‘Sketches in Afghaunistan’ by James
Atkinson. This view was taken from the camp of the Fourth Brigade, about a mile and a half south
of  Kandahar.  Atkinson  described  the  fortified  city:  ‘[It]  is  situated  on  the  north  side  of  an
extensive plain, about two miles from the lofty mountain called Baba-Wulee, and is surrounded
by a mud wall, about thirty feet high, with numerous bastions; the length of the city is about 5000
feet, and 4000 in breadth, with a small stream running across the interior from north to south.’
The second city of Afghanistan and its southern capital, Kandahar was ruled by a brother of the
Emir Dost Mohammed. He fled north to Mohammed’s stronghold of Kabul when the Army of the
Indus approached in 1839. The chieftains in the city were bribed with gold. The British then
organised a triumphant entry into Kandahar for Shah Shuja, to whom they bestowed an ‘official
coronation’ as Emir of Afghanistan, even though the crowd of Kandaharis was minuscule and
unenthusiastic.
4. Figure 2: Jellalabad, the bastion where General Elphinstone and other were buried during the
seige [sic] 1841-42. Photograph of the fort at Jalalabad, taken in Afghanistan by John Burke in
1878.  Burke,  an  intrepid  photographer  widely  travelled  in  the  Indian  sub-continent,  is  best
known  for  his  photography  during  the  Second  Anglo-Afghan  War  (1878-80).  He  entered
Afghanistan in 1878 with the Peshawar Valley Field Force and during the two-year campaign
worked steadily in the hostile environment of Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province
(now Pakistan), the scene of the military operations. Burke’s photographs include many of the
people of Afghanistan and his Afghan expedition produced an important visual document of the
region where strategies of the Great Game were played out. The Anglo-Russian rivalry (called the
Great Game) precipitated the second Afghan War. Afghanistan was of strategic importance to the
British in the defence of their Indian Empire, and the prevention of the spreading influence of
Russia.  They favoured a forward policy of extending India’s  frontiers to the Hindu Kush and
gaining control over Afghanistan. An opportunity presented itself when the Amir Sher Ali turned
away a British mission while a Russian mission was visiting his court at Kabul. The British had
demanded a permanent mission at Kabul which Sher Ali, trying to keep a balance between the
Russians and British, would not permit. British suspicions of the Amir’s perceived susceptibility
to  the  Russians  led  them  to  invade  Afghanistan.  Jalalabad,  the  traditional  winter  capital  of
Afghan rulers, was the first major city of Afghanistan encountered after traversing the Khyber
Pass. Situated in a fertile valley watered by the Kabul and Kunar rivers 90 miles east of Kabul, it
had once  been an important  town of  the  Gandhara  period (1st to  5 th centuries  AD),  but  the
modern city was built by the Mughals. Babar, the founder of the Mughal Empire, first planted
gardens here, and his grandson Jalaluddin Akbar built the city named after him in the 1560s. It
stands in a strategic position on the trade route to the Indian sub-continent. After taking the
Khyber Pass, the British troops’ occupation of Jalalabad was largely uneventful,  and although
minor skirmishes with local chiefs took place around it they moved about the city freely. Burke
took a number of photographs of the city and its surroundings which are believed to be among
the first taken of it; there are no other surviving images from this period. The British spent a
considerable amount of time here waiting for the Amir Yakub Khan in Kabul to accept their
terms and conditions.  The title of this photograph refers to the last resting place of General
William Elphinstone, a commander in the first Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42). Old and ill, he had
led the terrible retreat towards Jalalabad when many soldiers and civilians had been killed by
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Afghan fighters hiding in the hills.  He finally surrendered as a  hostage in exchange for safe
passage for civilians and died of dysentery in captivity.
5. Figure 3:  Jugdelluk,  the last  stand made by General  Elphinstone’s  army in the calamitous
retreat. This lithograph was taken from plate 21 of ‘Afghaunistan’ by Lieutenant James Rattray.
The British army suffered its worst disaster while retreating from Kabul in January 1842. On 6
January,  the  British  force  of  4,500  soldiers  and  about  12,000  followers  under  Major-General
Elphinstone pulled out of Kabul and left for Jallalabad. They had been guaranteed safe passage by
18 tribal leaders, but fell prey to the extreme cold, lack of food and supplies and attacks from
higher  ground  by  local  tribesmen.  The  column  suffered  terrible  losses  and  upon  reaching
Gandamak near the Jagdalak Pass the survivors made a last stand, only to be massacred in a final
ambush  on  12  January.  A  single  European  survivor,  Dr  William  Brydon,  managed  to  reach
Jalalabad the following day. Rattray himself rode through the pass in October 1842, as part of
Nott’s rear-guard. The pass rises in steep ascent; between its walls of blackened granite remnants
of barricades still stood, interlaced with bones. Piles of mummified bodies and whitening bones
were everywhere. Rattray, depressed that none had the time to perform a decent burial, wrote:
‘we were led on by our skeleton guides from mountain to deep ravine, over valley and rugged
cliff, skeletons for landmarks, for direction posts, skeletons.’
6. Figure 4: Jugdulluck Camp. Photograph with a distant view of a British army camp at Jagdalak
taken from the neighbouring hills by John Burke, 1879-80. The narrow Jagdalak Pass, situated
between Kabul and Jalalabad in Afghanistan, cuts through the forbidding Hindu Kush mountain
range and was the scene of bitter conflict during the first (1839-42) and second (1878-80) Afghan
Wars.  It  resonates in British military history particularly because many British soldiers were
killed here during the First Afghan War. The photograph is part of a series of images forming the
Afghan War albums which provided a visual  document of the country and resulted in Burke
achieving renown as the first significant photographer of Afghanistan and its people. The British
became involved in Afghanistan, trying to create a buffer state and protect their Indian empire in
the face of Russian expansion in Central Asia. The Anglo-Russian territorial rivalry created what
came to be known as the Great Game between the powers. In 1878 Burke accompanied British
forces into Afghanistan, despite being rejected for the role of official photographer. He financed
his trip by advance sales of his photographs ‘illustrating the advance from Attock to Jellalabad’.
In his two-year expedition in Afghanistan during the Second Afghan War,  Burke became the
photographer of the region where the strategies of the Great Game were played out. In a latter
phase of the war, from October 1879 to the summer of 1880, British troops (the Kabul Field Force)
under General Roberts occupied Kabul. Burke stayed here for many months, photographing the
city and its inhabitants and the surrounding territory. It is obvious from his varied images that
he had a close relationship with the British troops and did not hesitate to be part of the frontline
of action.
7. Figure 5: Interior of the palace of Shauh Shujah Ool Moolk, Late King of Cabul. This lithograph
is taken from plate 3 of ‘Afghaunistan’ by Lieutenant James Rattray. This scene shows Shah Shuja
in 1839 after his enthronement as Emir of Afghanistan in the Bala Hissar (fort) of Kabul. Rattray
wrote: ‘The Shah was a man of great personal beauty, and so well got up, that none could have
guessed his age.’ He continued: ‘the wild grandeur of the whole pageantry baffles description.’
The population watched Shuja’s grand entry in absolute silence. He was then seated on a white
and reputedly ancient marble throne. From here he could be seen by the court in the quadrangle
below. The wooden arches and pillars surrounding him were carved and painted and the ceiling
richly decorated. A year later the sanctity of the scene was bloodily violated: Shah Shuja was
murdered and ‘the sacred throne, [became] a lounge, a pitch-and-toss table.’
8. Figure 6: Shah Shuja holding a durbar at Kabul (Afghanistan). Water-colour sketch of Shah
Shuja holding a durbar at Kabul, Afghanistan by Jams Atkinson (1780–1852) between 1839 and
1840. This is plate 22 from the album ‘Sketches in Afghaunistan’. Inscribed on the mount is: ‘A
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Durbar held by Shah Shooja at Caubul.’  During the 19th century the British were sporadically
engaged in conflicts with Afghan leaders due to British fear of Russian encroachment on their
Indian colony and internal divisions within Afghanistan. Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk was the Amir of
Afghanistan from 1802 until  1809 when he was driven out by Mahmud Shah.  The Governor-
General of India Lord Auckland attempted to restore Shah Shuja in 1839 against the wishes of the
Afghan people.  This  policy  led  to  the  disastrous  first  Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42).  After  the
retreat of British troops from Kabul Shah Shuja shut himself up in his fortress, the Bala Hissar.
He left this refuge and was killed by adherents of Dost Muhammad and his son Akbar Khan on 5th
April 1842.
9. Figure 7: The Dewan-e Am looking towards Upper Bala Hissar [Kabul]. Photograph showing
the Diwan-i-Am or audience hall of the Amir at Kabul,  Afghanistan, with the fortress of Bala
Hissar  in  the  background,  taken in  1879  by  John Burke.  It  is  part  of  a  series  of  pictures  of
Afghanistan taken by Burke during the Second Afghan War (1878-80), which form an important
visual document of the country as it was during the time of the Great Game or Anglo-Russian
rivalry in the region. In 1878 Burke accompanied the British forces into Afghanistan, despite
being rejected for the role of official photographer. He financed his trip by advance sales of his
photographs ‘illustrating the advance from Attock to Jellalabad’. British forces re-occupied Kabul
in October 1879 in a fresh phase of the war, as a consequence of the killing of the British Resident
Sir Louis Cavagnari and his mission in September 1879. General Roberts who led them aimed to
secure his force at Kabul and establish a line of communication with the rest of the British forces
via the Khyber Pass. The cantonment here offered a secure and easily defendable position close
to the city; it was large enough to accommodate the troops and provided easy access eastwards
through the Khyber Pass towards Peshawar, northwards towards Kohistan and westwards into
the Chardeh plain. The ancient citadel of Bala Hissar or High Fortress dated from the 5th century
AD  and  encapsulated  Afghan  history,  with  successive  invasions  and  rulers  adding  to  and
rebuilding different parts of it. It was the seat of power and much of Kabul city lay within it and
its rulers sheltered within its thick walls. When the British under General Roberts occupied Kabul
in 1879 they stayed here too. When leaving, they partially destroyed it as a lesson to the Afghans.
10. See Noelle 1997 and Lal 1978 for Dost Mohammad and his two reigns. 
11. Figure 8: Surrender of Dost Mohommed Khan, to Sir William Hay Macnaghten Bart, at the
Entrance into Caubul from Killa-Kazee. This is plate 18 from ‘Sketches in Afghaunistan’ by James
Atkinson. The fear of growing Russian influence around India brought the British to the buffer
state of Afghanistan. In 1840 they ousted the Emir, Dost Mohammed, from Kabul and replaced
him with the pro-British Shah Shuja. This view shows the road leading from the camp to Kabul in
the valley of Qila-Qazi. It was here that Dost Mohammed suddenly gave himself up in November
1840. Atkinson wrote: ‘The road from Killa-Kazee is very confined, hemmed in by huge masses of
rock  on  the  left  hand  and  dense  groves  of  mulberry  trees  on  the  right.’  On  Mohammed’s
surrender: ‘This event occurred while the British Envoy was taking his accustomed ride, attended
by his  staff,  and totally  unconscious  of  any  intention  on the  part  of  the  Dost,  to  surrender
himself’. McNaghten was political secretary to George Eden, Lord Auckland, Governor General of
British India. He was convinced of the correctness of British fears over Russian intentions, and
the necessity of placing Afghanistan under British tutelage. 
12. Figure 9: Dost Mahommed, King of Caubul, and his youngest son. This lithograph is taken
from plate 2 of ‘Afghaunistan’ by Lieutenant James Rattray. Rattray was in the Bengal Army and
took part in the first Afghan War, from 1839 to 1842. This conflict saw Dost Mohammed deposed
as Emir of Afghanistan. Rattray was granted an audience with the Emir in Peshawar in January
1841. At this time, Dost Mohammed was a prisoner of state and on his way to exile in Calcutta.
Rattray was struck by the Emir’s deep voice, open manner and intelligent countenance, and by
his followers with their finely chiselled features and tall, handsome figures. The young boy with
his head shaven in the manner ‘peculiar to the rosy-cheeked children of Caubul’ was the Emir’s
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son from his youngest wife. Rattray wrote that since Dost Mohammed had been ‘a ruler just and
merciful and attentive to affairs of state [...] the population of Peshawur considered him to be
most unjustly treated by us.’ The decorations of this apartment were a facsimile of the Emir’s
former audience hall in the citadel of Ghazni.
13. See Hanifi 2011: 77-94 for attention to the economic impact of the first colonial occupation on
the economy of Afghanistan, Hopkins 2008: 25-30 for situating Pashtun tribal identity at the core
of colonial frameworks for understanding Afghanistan, and Barfield 2010 for one of the latest
installments in a long line of writers who perpetuate the Pashtun domination thesis. 
14. See Singh 1981 for a biography of Ahmad Shah Durrani. 
15. See Hanifi 2012a, 2012b, and 2012c (forthcoming). 
16. See Malcolm 1827 for Persia, Ahulwalia 1982 and Kaye 1854, chapter 8 for Metcalfe’s mission
to Lahore and Elphinstone 1992 for the British Mission to Kabul. 
17. Cotton 1892: 53-54. 
18. Faiz Muhammad, 1913, vol. 1: 77-8. 
19. The cost  at  supplying the mission was Rs.  5,244.7 but Elphinstone went into roughly Rs.
25,424.12  in  personal  debt  due  to  the  actions  of  a  corrupt  Afghan  banker  employed  by  the
mission that  was not  recovered until  at  least  1821.  See British Library,  Oriental  and African
Studies  Reading Room,  Mountstuart  Elphinstone Papers  Mss  Eur  F88/474 ‘Bills  and Accounts
1808-1820’ and Mss Eur F88/107 ‘Caubul Expense Report.’ 
20. See Connolly 1838, vol. 2: 58 for payment information, Masson, vol. 1: 191-193 for more on
Mullah Najib’s account of the Siaposh Kafirs. 
21. Hopkins 2008: Introduction, and Hanifi 2012b. 
22. Delhi  Resident Informs Elphinstone of  Reception of  Cabul Refugees,  Press List  II,  Book 4,
Serial n° 101, 12 April 1809, Elphinstone dispatch about Kabul Intelligence, Press List II, Serial
204,  22  May  1809,  Seton  to  Edmonstone,  Press  List  II,  Book  3,  Serial  n° 42,  17 April  1809,
(Archibald) Seton to (Neil Benjamin) Edmonstone, Press List II, Book 3, Serial n° 44, 18 May 1809,
Seton to Edmonstone, Press List II, Book 3, Serial No. 43, 28 April 1809, Seton to Edmonstone,
Press List II, Book 3, Serial n° 53, 3 August 1809
23. Cotton 1892: 73. 
24. See Faiz Muhammad, 1913, vol. 1: 94 for Ranjit Singh’s practice of carrying Shuja around in a
cage. For Shuja’s narration of his time in Lahore in Ranjit Singh’s custody see Waqiat-e Shah Shuja,
The Twenty Sixth Event: 40-51. 
25. Seton to Edmonstone, Press List II, Book 3, Serial n° 42, 17 April 1809. 
26. Seton to Edmonstone, Press List II, Book 3, Serial n° 53, 3 August 1809. 
27. Shuja’s Wife’s Desire to Enter British Territory, Press List II, Book 9, Serial n° 2, 19 December
1812. 
28. ibid. 
29. Use of  Native Newspapers to Contradict  Rumours that the British Espouse Shuja’s  Cause,
Press List II, Book 9, Serial n° 106 and Ochterlony to Metcalfe, Press List IV, Book 61, Serial n° 87,
10 June 1813. See also Wade to Macnaghten about the concentration of Lohani commerce, Press
List V, Book 101. Serial n° 17, 21 May 1834. 
30. Elphinstone 1992, vol. 1: 68. 
31. Shuja’s Intention to Seek Asylum in British Territory, Press List II, Book 8, Serial n° 51, 9 July
1813. 
32. Chabra 2005: 92. 
33. (unknown first name) Adam to (unknown first name) Birch, Press List II, Book 9 Part One,
Serial n° 15, 15 march 1815. 
34. (unknown first name) Murray to Ochterlony, Press List III, Book 18, Serial n° 157, 7 December
1816. 
35. Murray to Ochterlony, Press List III, Book 18, Serial n° 142, 10 November 1816. 
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36. Metcalfe to Ochterlony, Press List III, Book 18, Serial n° 136, 3 November 1816. 
37. Murray to Ochterlony, Press List III, Book 18, Serial n° 142, 10 November 1816, Murray to
Ochterlony, Press List III, Book 18, Serial n° 157, 7 December 1816, Murray to Ochterlony, Press
List III, Book 18, Serial No. 158, 10 December 1816, unkown to Birch, Press List III, Book 19, Serial
n° 35, 2 March 1817, Adam to Metcalfe, Press List III, Book 19, Serial n° 59, 10 May 1817, Adam to
Metcalfe, Press List III, Book 19, Serial n° 65, 17 June 1817, and Murray to Ochterloney, Press List
III, Book 19, Serial n° 70, 5 July 1817. 
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45. Murray to Ochterlony, Press List III, Book 18, Serial n° 158, 10 December 1816. See Freidmann
1971 for more on Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi. 
46. ‘Trevelyan’s Note on Commerce of Afghanistan,’ and ‘Trevelyan’s Note on Trade of Cabul,’
National Archives of India, Foreign P.C., September 5, 1836, Proceeding n° 9-19. For published
examples of colonial officials viewing themselves as literally following in Alexander’s footsteps,
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British on 6 August 1838 (15th jumad al-awwal 1254) see Faiz Muhammad, 1913, vol. 1: 134-141. 
50. Faiz Muhammad, 1913, vol. I: 114-115 and 118-125. 
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ABSTRACTS
The essay uses colonial archival materials from the Archives of the Punjab Province in Lahore to
address the thirty-year period between the two reigns of  the Durrani  Afghan Monarch Shah
Shuja (r. 1803-1809 and 1839-1842). Focusing on the 1809-1839 period, the first part of the essay
deals with Mountstuart Elphinstone’s 1809 diplomatic mission and Shuja’s flight from Peshawar.
The second part of the article considers the communication between Shah Shuja’s primary wife
and colonial officials that culminated in Shuja’s receipt of housing and a monthly British pension
in Ludhiana in 1816. The third part of the essay treats Shuja’s aborted attempt to recapture Kabul
without British support in 1832-1833 and its consequences for him in Ludhiana. Shuja’s lack of
Pashto credentials,  his  dependency on British capital,  and his  circular  migration pattern are
viewed  as  normative  rather  than  exceptional  for  Afghan  rulers,  and  as  such  this  essay
contributes to a revision of the traditional historiography of Afghanistan that views the country
through the incompatible lenses of Pashtun ethnic domination of the Afghan state structure and
Pashtun tribal resistance to Afghan state formation.1
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